Friday Night 1971

Smell of work on the edge of the door. Sun settles into dusk. Friday night. A quiet descends on the house. The boys have gathered, gleaming from the scrub. Joe takes up his fiddle like a staff on his knee. ‘So now, what do you say tonight, Lyall’? 

His second Friday night with the men in the back parlour; women and girls gathered in the front after flirting on the silage all day, remembering his silence the week before. Knowing he would have to stand up a little.

‘Well,’ what to say, ‘well it’s not easy for me to say anything actually. Anything of interest to you. I haven’t really lived that interesting a life, and you Joe, from what I heard last week, have lived a lot.’ The men stirred. ‘Not too much, not too much. But maybe a jot more than yourself.’ Joe with a beard down to his belt, a life-time cop in New York City until ten years ago, ‘but lack of experience is no excuse for silence and a still tongue, is it Lyall? You must have something to say.’ John pushes, ‘So what do you say Lyall? What’s you’re topic?’ ‘Well, I could say a little, something, anything really.’ ‘About what?’ Christie who makes raffia chairs and rides a donkey. ‘What could you say Lyall?’

Without thinking he says, ‘What if what you say is sad?’ ‘Sure, everything’s sad some days Lyall,’ Jack Sullivan, with the two fields below, tended as if they were lovers, ‘I wouldn’t see that as an impediment would you Joe?’  Joe runs his thumb along the strings. ‘Sure we won’t know until he speaks.’ Eila at the open the door, leaning on the jam, ‘Will you say to us why you paid £1,400 for your place above. That’s sad. He could do that, couldn’t he John?’ John, who’d asked the same question in mild anger pitching silage this afternoon, now mellowed said, ‘He could if he wanted’. Lyall looked over at Eila, ‘Well I loved the look of it’. ‘And where did you first see it that you loved the look on it?’ He wanted to say I told you this already but to do so would compromise their conversation this afternoon where she’d explicitly said, ‘This is private Lyall, just between us’, and he’d felt the hook lodge and pull him toward her and he’d replied, ‘Naturally’. And now, ‘I saw a photograph of it on the mountain’. ‘And what kind of photograph would that be?’. ‘A Polaroid.’ All eyes on him. Christie is first. ‘A what?  Is that a big photograph or what Lyall.’ He knows what a Polaroid is. ‘No, a very small one’.  

Joe stroked his fiddle strings, ‘Then, is it this that’s sad Lyall? Buying a dot on a Polaroid mountain?’ Eila, now part of the pack. ‘How is it that an Englishman can come over here and pay £1,400 for a ruin on our own Irish soil sold through a Polaroid photograph? I’d say that’s a bit sad Joe, wouldn’t you?’ Mrs O’Shea came in from the front, checks the stew on the range, ‘Sad or not he did it and put as much of his back into our work today as any.’ She cut more apple pie for him and puts it on his plate, smiles and returns to the front room, to the ladies. He looked around the parlour. ‘Well, what you don’t know is that £1,400 is nothing for that place. If it was in England, it’d be worth £14,000. And anyway, I didn’t buy it for its monetary value and it’s not a sad thing to have done. Sadness comes from a broken heart. Or the loss of someone you love, not money.’

‘Ah well now Lyall,’ Joe ran the strings with his frayed bow, ‘which is it that you mean to speak of tonight, if not money? A broken heart or the loss of a loved one?’ Neither. He didn’t mean to speak of either tonight. ‘Which would ye say Christie, is the more sad, a broken heart or the loss of a loved one?’ Christie thought hard, pulling at his lip, ‘Well now, you would have to say that these two are very close, heart break and loss. Both make a sadness for which there are varying degrees.  You could well say that sadness comes of a heart broken by any manner of loss, but the question is how many times can a heart be broken, Joe?’

‘Sure, that’s the distinction that should be made in this question,’ Joe lay down his fiddle, looking over at Lyall with a smile, then, ‘what losses would break the heart over and over again Lyall?’ This wasn’t what he’d imagined tonight to be. ‘Well, this would be different for each person I think’. Joe again, ‘Well of course now that goes without saying, but to take your topic forward we need to know what kind of losses would break the heart and ignite the sadness occurring.’ Eila looks over, ‘If loss of something breaks the heart, then sadness pours through the crack and takes over. Could you see it that way?’ Christie coughed into his handkerchief. ‘You could, you could indeed girl, isn’t that the case Joe?’  ‘You could. Loss is the common denominator here, and no doubt, its loss that that breaks the heart.’

Joe began, eyes half closed, contemplating loss, ‘Now Lyall, your subject is a matter of some complexity and feeling if we look at it deeply. So, to proceed, there are stages to this Lyall. Let us break the topic down. Look into loss and see the way it moves through the heart to sadness. We could start with a common loss that might cause a heart to ache, not break’. John sat forward nodding. Mumbled half agreement from Christie and Jack, each have stories of common loss. ‘And then you might have an uncommon loss that cracks the heart open to a sadness but recuperates over time.’ Christie folded his arms, ‘You could.’ ‘And then you could have a catastrophic loss that would obliterate the heart into a smithereen of sadness, as you would imagine occurred in Mary as she gazed on her son at the end thinking him dead.’ Lyall fell in with, ‘Death and loss would be catastrophic for anyone, Joe.’ Eila looked at him hard, ‘Not if there’s grace and redemption in the suffering of it.’ ‘Are you sure there is such a thing?’ He mumbles half to himself.

John picked up the poker, ‘I think I have it Joe.’ ‘Go ahead now John.’ ‘You would measure sadness on a rod, as you say Joe, at one end the common, at the other the catastrophic loss, each mark on the rod showing the broken heart and its sadness’. Eila barged in, ‘A common sadness might be livened by the loss of a trinket; an uncommon sadness could be the ending and loss of a romance, an absolute end I mean; and the catastrophic sadness would include a death and loss of love itself’.

Joe smiled, ‘We are getting some order in this for you Lyall.’ Eila went to John, taking the poker held flat between his hands. ‘So the common loss and heart ache is nothing, it’s what a chicken feels when she lays an egg so we put that here’, she licked her finger and cleared a mark on one end of the poker, 'the uncommon goes in the middle here; and the catastrophic at the end here where the heart is crushed to dust. And each mark would tell the story of a broken heart.’

All contemplated the rod in a silence broken by Eila, ‘But isn’t there a different kind of loss Joe? One that doesn’t break the heart, or cause it to ache with sadness, but makes it sing?’ ‘Ah, the loss of constraint girl, the loss of the constraint is to what you refer. This loss cuts you loose. But there’s a danger to it.’ Christie sighed into a chord of his own, ‘There is too. A great danger. In fact you could say this loss is the most dangerous and could lead to the greatest sadness. Sure this is topic in itself.’ Joe considered, ‘Ay, the loss of constraint, and one we’ll turn to another night.’

Jack puffed on his long pipe, ‘And then you have the loss of an animal. A lamb for example, lost on the mountain, or a chicken taken by the fox. Or a loss of a field to a bet. Or hay to a bad rain. There’s money in such losses.’ Joe held up the bow, ‘These are material losses you might say Jack, and sure, could result in a sadness or more, but these don’t fit easily on our rod. It is the psychological view we are taking not the material in this case, do you see?’ ‘I do Joe, I do, but remember now, there is a way where the loss of the material can lead to the loss of the psychological, and that is often the case, but I take your point. We are considering the effect on the heart, not the pocket, isn’t that right.’ ‘You have it boy, you do.’

Now Lyall spoke blind, playing along, ‘And there’s the loss of respect.’ Eila pounced, ‘You don’t lose respect Lyall, you give it up.’ All nodded along. Again without thinking, ‘Okay, then there is a loss of friendship, you can lose the friendship of someone.’ ‘That you can,’ Joe tightened his bow, ‘That you can Lyall, if someone turns against you and breaks your heart, but this loss is also self-inflicted, for you always has the friendship until you give it up.’

‘As we do,’ Christie soulful, ‘Now Lyall, how many broken friendships do you see in the valley?’ Pause. ‘None. You don’t see any do you? Well we here now do see them. There are people here who haven’t spoken or looked to each other for two generations or more for the sake of a broken fence, let alone a broken heart.’ Joe shifted and waved his beard. ‘We might be well moving the goalposts here Chris, we don’t want to confuse the poor fellow with the history of Garranes.’ Eila bit again, ‘Sure he’s confused already enough as it is. He hasn’t really told us what loss and sadness he’s talking about. And he hasn’t told us yet why he bought up above except that its worth a £1,400 punt.’ Jack leant forward, eyes bright, ‘Did you lose your dog Lyall? That’s a terrible sad loss, to lose a dog.’

Mrs O’Shea brought turf in for the range, door clanking open, sparks floating to soot. She smiled as she adjusted the Tilley to give more light, urging defiance despite the pity in her eyes, then returned to the ladies.

Eila is half looking at him, waiting. ‘You can lose your mind.’ He sagged biting his lip. Fuck.  Eila can’t resist, ‘And did you find yours yet up there on the mountain? Did you? Among the rush and the sheep?’ Christie, eyes closed scratched his ear, ‘Well that’s not an easy thing to find is it Joe? The mind?’  ‘Ah, the mind, an easy thing to lose, not an easy thing to find.’ Christie opened his eyes, ‘And is it not madness to lose a mind Joe?’ ‘It is known to be so, but Lyall hasn’t the madness yet, so his mind is still with us for a while at least. But does loss of mind fit our scheme here? Are we sure that a heart break connects to a loss of the mind, Lyall?’ It’s a question he must answer, ‘Well, the two are related. Mind and heart. Heart and mind’. John played with the poker as if measuring up a child, ‘So, will we add this to the rod Joe?’  ‘No. You’d need a new rod for loss of the mind,’ Joe answered, ‘You could have degrees of a loss of mind but on a different rod.’

Eila sensed the vein she wanted from him, ‘And where would you say your lost mind would sit on that rod Lyall? Would it be common or uncommon?’ He shifted, heaved, caught by the question. He should have seen this coming. ‘Or catastrophic? Would you have a catastrophic loss of the mind Joe? On the rod?’ ‘You would have to include it, but the rod would have no use to the catastrophic. It would be over.’ Jack stirred ‘That it would, and it’s been close through the years.’ The topic was closing down.

John said something to Christie in Irish and Eila laughed at the back of her hand. ‘He said did you have much of a mind to lose in the first place.’ Lyall laughed, ‘That’s my problem, I don’t really know about mind at all, John, what is it? Do you know? Does anybody here know?’ Joe cut in, ‘Steady Lyall, what we have here is the subject in hand. We now know we have common and uncommon degrees of loss that may be felt in the sadness of a broken heart. We have a measure of catastrophic loss and we have included the mind as an adjunct to the play, which can itself be lost.’ He grazed the room expectantly; all were with him.

‘So now, Lyall, what do you say, where would your loss and sadness sit on the rod? How many broken hearts do you have in your hand?’ Silence. ‘Well now, using our rod as the measure, in which category should we put your loss?  Would it be common or uncommon?’ He sat as a bird waiting for shot, ‘Common’ he said, wondering if he should have told the truth. Christie waved vaguely in the air, ‘Thanks god.’  ‘And would it be the common loss of love and the heartbreak in that?’  ‘It would, and I lose my mind a bit.’ Eila smiled to kill, ‘Sure isn’t that an English indulgence Joe? Can we not put indulgence on the rod as well John? And bar sweet romantics from the house?’ Joe began to play low and slow, fiddle waking to its part as he sang in Irish:

I invoke the land of Ireland

Much coursed be the fertile sea,

Jula’s laughter from the other room filtered in and Mrs O’Shea’s voice along with Eileen’s and the girls orchestrated the mood of the Friday evening. Eila translates for Lyall, an echo in tune with his mood.

Fertile be the fruit-strewn mountain

Fruit-strewn be the showery wood,

Showery be the river of waterfalls,

Of waterfalls be the lake of deep pools,

Joe spoke softly, scraping slowly across the strings, ‘Well now Lyall, the mind is never still; it is always running. So to lose it altogether could be a terrible trouble’. Christie chuckled, ‘It might not be a bad thing, Joe, to stop it running for a while. In fact it could be a pleasure.’ ‘And if it were such a pleasure why isn’t everyone doing it?’

deep pooled be the hill-top well,

a well of tribes be the assembly,

and assembly of kings be Tamair,

‘Sure that’s a reasonable question Lyall, what do you say?’ Lyall looks up from the music as Joe paused to tune strings, and gazes at Eila sat on the rug leant against Joe’s chair, saying nothing. ‘So now, do we have it John?’ John mused the poker, ‘Well now Joe I think that completes the form of the rod. And it is a comprehensive tool of measurement of the topic.’ Joe looked over at Lyall, ‘So have you found your place on the rod, Lyall?’ He looked back at Joe, ‘I have Joe, I think I have.’ Joe continued to play and sing:

Tamair be a hill of tribes,

The tribes of the sons of Mil,

Of Mil of the ships, the barks.

Let the lofty bark be Ireland, lofty Ireland darkly sung

An incantation of great cunning

Eila leant across under the music and tapped him on his foot, ‘And is it your love Lyall, that brings you here and makes you long to leave, both at the same time. Is it now?’

The great cunning of the wives of the Bres,

The wives of Bres, of Buaigne;

The great lady of Ireland

Eremoth had conquered her,

Ir, Eber have invoked for her.

I invoke the land of Ireland.

Joe ended with four Ailiu iath nErenn’s of the last line. Eila repeats them in English for Lyall and asks, ‘And what do you invoke when your love sends you to loss, Lyall’? He sat quiet and lost, settling in for a while, for the night. Happy to hear his silence Eila looked him full on in the face, laughing, ‘Sure, but you’re young still, and the common is a fine place to be as you start out. And I’ll wonder about you, how you’ll do on the edge of catastrophe.’

Elinor Ostrom

 

Before proceeding further, it is worth briefly introducing the genius whose work provides a philosophy for early 21^st century Britain and the organisational foundation underpinning policies that could enable the fundamental restructuring of the British political economy and civic landscape.

Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elinor_Ostrom#) was an American political economist whose work fundamentally challenged many of the assumptions that shaped twentieth-century political and economic thought. In 2009 she became the first woman to receive the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for her pioneering research into how communities successfully govern shared resources through systems of collective self-organisation.

Working primarily at Indiana University over a career spanning more than five decades, Ostrom undertook extensive empirical research across forests, fisheries, irrigation systems, water basins, urban communities and public institutions throughout the world. Rather than beginning with abstract economic theory, she examined how real people actually organised themselves when faced with the practical challenge of managing shared resources over long periods of time.

Her findings challenged one of the central assumptions of modern political economy: that effective governance must ultimately depend either upon centralised state authority or competitive market mechanisms. Instead, she demonstrated that communities are often capable of constructing durable, adaptive and democratically accountable systems of collective governance themselves.

Where Keynes largely focused on macroeconomic stabilisation, Ostrom focused on institutional self-organisation. Where Friedman prioritised market allocation, Ostrom explored cooperative stewardship. Where Thomas Piketty diagnoses the concentration of wealth and power, Ostrom analyses participatory governance. Where Joseph Stiglitz exposes information asymmetries and market failure, Ostrom investigates how communities create durable systems of collective coordination. Where Mariana Mazzucato rehabilitates strategic state capacity, Ostrom asks how governance itself can become layered, distributed, adaptive and democratically embedded. Where Kate Raworth redefines the ecological boundaries within which economies must operate, Ostrom examines how human communities actually govern shared ecological systems sustainably over time. Where Daron Acemoglu analyses the role of institutions in shaping prosperity and democratic stability, Ostrom explores how institutions themselves emerge, adapt and endure through collective participation.

In this sense, Ostrom's contribution is organisational as much as economic. Her theory of polycentric governance—systems composed of multiple, overlapping and mutually accountable centres of decision-making operating across different scales—offers one of the most important democratic organisational models available to the twenty-first century. It provides a framework capable of integrating local knowledge, democratic participation, institutional adaptability, ecological stewardship, technological complexity and long-term resilience without collapsing into either bureaucratic over-centralisation or purely extractive market logic.

Yet the significance of Ostrom's work extends beyond institutional design. At its heart lies the regeneration of the polis itself: the active civic sphere through which citizens participate in the governance of the communities upon which their lives depend.

For much of modern political history, citizens have increasingly been recast as consumers, taxpayers, service users and voters, while governance has become concentrated within distant bureaucracies, large corporations and professional political classes. The result has been a gradual weakening of civic identity and a growing sense of disconnection between people, place and power.

Ostrom points towards a different possibility.

Her research suggests that democratic resilience emerges not primarily from central control, but from the capacity of citizens to organise collectively around the shared challenges and opportunities that shape their daily lives. Strong institutions, in this view, are not substitutes for civic participation but expressions of it. The health of a democracy therefore depends not simply upon elections or administrative competence, but upon the strength of the civic relationships that connect citizens to one another, to place, and to the institutions through which collective decisions are made.

The challenge is not simply to transfer powers out of Whitehall. It is to create governance systems capable of rebuilding civic participation, regional identity and democratic responsibility.

In this sense, regionalism is not merely a constitutional reform. It is  democratic activism. Its purpose is the reconstruction of the polis itself: the recovery of civic capacity, collective agency and shared stewardship within the places people actually live.

For much of the twentieth century political debate revolved around the relationship between state and market. The central question was whether governments should intervene more or less in economic life. The twenty-first century presents a different challenge. Ecological instability, technological disruption, democratic distrust, regional inequality, ageing populations and institutional complexity are forcing societies to confront a deeper question: how do people govern themselves collectively in an increasingly interconnected world?

It is here that Ostrom's work assumes its greatest significance.

If Keynes helped explain how industrial capitalism could be stabilised, and Friedman how markets could be liberalised, Ostrom sought to understand how complex societies remain governable. Her work provides not simply an economic theory, nor merely a constitutional model, but a democratic systems architecture capable of organising cooperation across multiple scales whilst preserving participation, adaptability and legitimacy – the revitalisation of the democratic imperative.

The policies required are therefore not simply to reform government. They seek to contribute to the emergence of a more participatory democratic architecture: one capable of aligning citizens, institutions and regional economies around the long-term flourishing of both people and place.

In that sense, the objective is neither a larger state nor a smaller one. It is an inter-cultural, more capable and resilient society bound by common and regional interests linked to national and international priorities governing the future of civilisation itself .

Elinor Ostrom Publications

·         Public Entrepreneurship: A Case Study in Ground Water Basin Management (1965)

·         Managing the Commons (1977)

·         Strategies of Political Inquiry (1982)

·         Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development (1993)

·         Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (1994)

·         Local Commons and Global Interdependence (1995)

·         Governing the Commons (1990)

·         Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems (1992)

·         Trust and Reciprocity (2003)

·         The Commons in the New Millennium (2003)

·         Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005)

·         The Samaritan's Dilemma (2005)

·         Linking the Formal and Informal Economy (2006)

·         The Challenge of the Commons (2008)

·         Working Together (2010)

·         Questions, Challenges, and Strategies of the Commons (2010)

·         The Future of the Commons (2012)

For most readers, the three indispensable titles are:

·         Governing the Commons (1990)

·         Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005)

·         Working Together (2010)

 

The Old Oak Tree

 

One of the most telling outcomes of Tony Blair’s recent intervention into Labour’s future has been the intensity of the response from Britain’s politocracy.

Politicians, journalists, think tanks, party loyalists and professional commentators immediately lined up to defend, condemn, reinterpret or weaponise his proposals. Yet for all the noise generated, something important seemed largely absent from the debate. Very little attention was given to the possibility that Britain’s difficulties may now run deeper than any collection of policies can adequately address.

Labour came to power on the back of a deep and visceral demand for change. Yet what many people wanted was not simply a change of government. Governments come and go. Parties rise and fall. Prime Ministers arrive with great fanfare before disappearing into the footnotes of history. What much of the electorate sensed was that something deeper had gone wrong.

I will not rehearse the endless catalogue of failures that brought us here. Suffice to say that the Liz Truss fiasco bundled the previous twenty years into a single bonfire of incompetence. Within weeks, confidence in economic management evaporated, financial markets recoiled, and institutions once assumed to be stable suddenly looked alarmingly fragile.

Yet Truss did not create Britain’s problems. She merely exposed them. For a brief moment the country was forced to confront what many had suspected for years: that beneath the slogans, manufactured certainties, tribal point-scoring, grubby corruptions  and endless political theatre, the machinery of central government itself had become dangerously hollowed out and inept.

The result is a country that increasingly feels lost to itself, embroiled in culture wars fought from ideological trenches with energies that might once have been directed towards solving real problems.

Economic growth remains sluggish. Productivity remains weak. Public services strain under growing demand. Regional inequalities persist. Housing remains unaffordable for millions. Infrastructure deteriorates. Trust in political institutions continues to decline. Climate instability increasingly shapes economic and social planning. Artificial intelligence promises both extraordinary opportunities and profound disruption. Demographic pressures continue to mount. Geopolitical tensions are rising. Energy security has once again become a strategic concern.

Perhaps most strikingly, many of the surviving centrepieces of Blairs modernised Thatcherism now appear increasingly threadbare. Water privatisation promised efficiency yet delivered polluted rivers and heavily indebted monopolies. Rail privatisation promised competition yet survives through substantial public subsidy while passengers endure high costs and chronic disruption. Across schools, hospitals and local government, outsourcing, consultancy and contractual fragmentation have often produced layers of administration without corresponding improvements in outcomes.

None of this proves that markets are inherently flawed or that public ownership is automatically superior. Reality is rarely so simple. It does suggest, however, that forty years of marketisation have produced outcomes profoundly different from those originally promised. Increasingly the question is not whether services are public or private, but whether they exist to create public value or facilitate private extraction.

Yet despite the scale of these challenges, much of British politics remains trapped within intellectual arguments inherited from another age.

Perhaps this should not surprise us.

The question of change itself has occupied philosophers for more than two and a half thousand years. Heraclitus argued that everything flows. Parmenides argued that reality is fundamentally unchanging. Aristotle provided the Third Way. His famous acorn-to-oak metaphor suggested that change is neither illusion nor chaos but the unfolding of latent potential. The acorn and the oak are not different things. They are different stages of the same thing becoming itself.

But what Blair and his ten ‘policies’ have done is to shine a spotlight on the lack of intellectual power or imagination required to regenerate the aged oak in whose branches we all live.

The great political and economic struggles of the twentieth century were not simply arguments about tax rates, spending levels or regulation. They were arguments about how that oak should be pruned and how the relationship between state, market and society should be organised.

The first major post-war answer emerged through the work of John Maynard Keynes.

Keynes provided more than economic theory. He offered a governing philosophy. Economic recovery required investment rather than austerity. Mass unemployment threatened democratic stability itself. Governments possessed both the right and responsibility to intervene during periods of crisis. Markets were important, but left entirely to themselves they could generate instability and social dislocation.

The devastation of two world wars gave these ideas enormous force. Keynes helped shape the Bretton Woods institutions and the broader intellectual foundations of the post-war settlement. The Marshall Plan reflected a profoundly Keynesian insight: economic collapse breeds extremism while prosperity encourages stability. Reconstruction rather than punishment. Investment rather than extraction. Shared prosperity rather than economic coercion.

The result was one of the most successful periods of economic and social development in British history. Public investment expanded. The welfare state grew. Public services strengthened. Economic management became a central responsibility of government.

For almost three decades the model appeared remarkably successful.

Yet by the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s the settlement began to fracture. Rising international competition, slowing productivity growth, inflation, oil shocks, fiscal pressures and industrial conflict combined to undermine confidence in the existing order.

The newly planted oak was showing signs of stress.

Into that crisis stepped the second great intellectual force of the post-war era.

Drawing heavily upon the work of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, the emerging New Right challenged many of the assumptions that had dominated post-war thinking. Markets were viewed as more effective allocators of resources than governments. Competition became a source of discipline and innovation. Excessive state intervention was portrayed as economically damaging and potentially threatening to liberty itself.

Inspired by Hayek and championed in Britain by Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher with Milton Friedman, this philosophy transformed the country. Privatisation, deregulation, lower taxation, reduced trade union power and market competition reshaped British economic life.

Like Keynesianism before it, Thatcherism was not merely a collection of policies.

It was a coherent worldview.

Yet it also contained a paradox. While seeking a smaller economic state, Thatcher frequently relied upon a stronger political state to impose reform. The result was not less power but a different deployment of centralised power.

If Keynes provided much of the intellectual architecture for constructing the post-war settlement, Hayek and Friedman provided Thatcher with much of the intellectual ammunition for dismantling significant parts of it.

The political economy of the late twentieth century can therefore be understood as a long argument between those two philosophies.

By the time Tony Blair and Gordon Brown arrived in government in 1997, neither side had fully won.

Instead, New Labour attempted something different.

The Third Way was less a new philosophy than an ambitious synthesis of Thatcherism and Keynes. Markets would generate wealth. Government would invest in people. Education would drive social mobility. Economic growth would fund social progress. Globalisation would be embraced rather than resisted. Public services would be modernised through privatisation rather than fundamentally restructured.

In many respects the strategy proved remarkably successful. The National Minimum Wage, devolution, the Good Friday Agreement, major investment in health and education, reductions in child poverty and sustained economic growth remain significant achievements. Blair supplied the political vision. Brown supplied much of the economic machinery. Together they created one of the most electorally successful governments of the post-war era.

Yet the Third Way also rested upon assumptions that increasingly no longer hold.

It assumed continuing globalisation. It assumed relatively cheap energy. It assumed rising living standards. It assumed stable democratic institutions. Above all, it assumed that economic growth would continue to generate sufficient resources to reconcile competing interests.

Those assumptions have steadily weakened.

The financial crisis of 2008 exposed vulnerabilities and corporate corruption within global finance. Subsequent austerity weakened public capacity. Brexit revealed profound territorial and cultural fractures. Climate instability accelerated. Trust in institutions continued to decline. Artificial intelligence now promises to reshape labour markets, governance systems and economic organisation in ways that remain poorly understood.

This is where Blair’s recent intervention becomes particularly revealing.

His ten policies themselves are less important than the assumptions underpinning them. Much of the thinking remains rooted in the worldview that made New Labour successful: technological innovation, economic growth, global competitiveness, institutional reform and market dynamism.

These are not unreasonable objectives.

Yet they assume that the challenges confronting Britain are extensions of those faced during the late twentieth century rather than symptoms of a fundamentally different historical moment.

Blair’s enthusiasm for artificial intelligence reflects a continuing belief that technological innovation can unlock a new wave of prosperity. His willingness to embrace Trump and elements of contemporary American political discourse suggests a similar faith in the adaptive capacity of existing institutions. Even his confidence in technological solutions to climate and energy challenges reflects an assumption that innovation will largely resolve the contradictions that innovation itself has helped create.

Perhaps. But perhaps not.

Artificial intelligence, economic electrification and digital infrastructure will require enormous quantities of reliable energy and water supply and vast material resources. Fossil induced climate instability is already imposing costs that previous generations scarcely imagined. Social fragmentation continues to deepen. Trust continues to erode. Regional disparities remain entrenched. Institutions designed for twentieth-century industrial society increasingly struggle to respond to twenty-first-century complexity.

The challenge facing Britain may therefore not be how to accelerate the existing model. It may be how to rethink it.

Keynes responded to the collapse of pre-war laissez-faire capitalism. Hayek, Friedman and Thatcher responded to the crisis of the post-war settlement. Blair responded to the opportunities created by globalisation. Each offered a coherent philosophy for the age in which they lived.

The question confronting Britain today is whether all three were responding to conditions that no longer exist.

If so, the task before us is not simply to improve existing policies or modernise existing institutions. It is to develop a new understanding of how society should organise itself under conditions that were not  fully anticipated by previous administrations: ecological instability, technological disruption, declining trust, demographic change, resource constraints and widening regional inequality.

Periods of stability rarely produce radical ideas. Existing assumptions appear sufficient. Existing institutions appear durable. It is periods of uncertainty and systemic stress that force societies to re-examine their deepest beliefs.

History suggests that genuinely transformative philosophies emerge not during periods of confidence but during periods of crisis.

Britain may now be entering precisely such a moment.

The old arguments are exhausted. This helps explain the increasingly barren quality of modern British politics. Cameron offered managerial conservatism. Brexit exposed fractures neither major party properly understood. May struggled to reconcile incompatible mandates. Johnson substituted performance buffoonery for strategic substance. Truss briefly attempted ideological purification with catastrophic consequences. Starmer's government inherited a state weakened by years of institutional erosion but has yet to articulate a governing philosophy capable of replacing those that have failed.

Britain therefore finds itself in an unusual position. It is not suffering from a shortage of policies. It is suffering from a shortage of ideas. Yet much of Westminster continues to argue within intellectual frameworks inherited from the late twentieth century while confronting problems that belong to the twenty-first. The old assumptions have disappeared. We remain, however, in the branches of the same ageing oak hacked at by successive generations. The question is no longer whether individual branches require pruning. The question is whether the conditions in which the tree itself must survive have fundamentally changed.

That is the conversation Blair’s intervention has inadvertently exposed.

And it is the conversation British politics has so far shown remarkably little willingness to have and one that we will continue anon.

 

Dancing snail

 

A 2°C World

 Beneath the spiraling madness of this 21st century lurks a composite catastrophe that just gets worse as it is ignored by those who currently run the world. For those of us living on the edge of Europe watching it all go down, it's tempting to head for the hills and to die in relative peace before we boil away. 

To recap:  The  global warming target was formally adopted on December 12, 2015, a 1.5°C a rise from the pre-industrial (1850 - 1900)  level. This was the key component of the Paris Agreement during the COP21 UN Climate Change Conference. This is now, save something unknown occurring, sliding toward 2 Degrees or beyond.

There is no single moment when the world tips and everything changes. Instead, the world creeps inexorably to 2°C — heat layered on heat, shocks flowing together, systems losing their ability to recover. What once felt exceptional becomes seasonal. What once felt extraordinary becomes routine.

By the time global temperatures reaches this range, the stability baseline has already shifted. Summers are hotter everywhere, the extremes are sharper. Heatwaves last longer, strike more often, and push further into places that were once temperate. Cities begin to feel different. Not just warmer, but heavier—air that does not cool at night, infrastructure that strains, transport that slows, hospitals that fill. The difference between coping and failing becomes a question of access: access to cooling, to water, to space, to money. For hundreds of millions, that access is limited. Heat stops being weather. It becomes a constraint to survival.¹²

Water becomes less reliable. In some regions it disappears slowly, through drought that stretches across seasons and years. In others it arrives all at once, overwhelming systems built for a different climate. Rivers no longer behave as they did. Snowpacks shrink. Groundwater is drawn down faster than it is replenished. The stress spreads unevenly, but widely. Hundreds of millions—and likely billions—live with increasing uncertainty over supply. Water is no longer assumed. It is managed, rationed, contested.²

Food follows. Not through sudden global collapse, but through repeated disruption. Harvests fail in one region, then another. Heat reduces yields. Drought weakens soil. Floods destroy crops outright. Markets absorb some of this, at first. Trade redistributes supply. Prices rise, then stabilise. But as events begin to overlap—multiple regions affected in the same year—the system tightens. Price volatility increases. Imports become less reliable. For wealthier populations, this registers as inflation. For poorer populations, it registers as starvation.⁹

Along the coasts, the sea advances persistently. Flooding that was once rare becomes frequent. Saltwater moves into freshwater systems, into soils, into infrastructure. Some places defend. They build walls, raise roads, reinforce drainage. Others cannot. The cost is too high, the capacity too low, the land too exposed. In these places, retreat begins—not as a single decision, but as a series of losses. A flooded season, a failed well, a damaged home. Over time, people move. Not all at once. But steadily.⁴

In low-lying island states, the problem is not only land. It is habitability. Freshwater becomes unreliable. Crops fail. Storms intensify. Communities face a future where remaining is possible for a time, but increasingly difficult. The question is no longer whether land will disappear, but when.³

The ocean changes in ways that are less visible, but no less profound. It absorbs heat and carbon, buffering the atmosphere, but at a cost. It becomes warmer, more acidic, less oxygenated. Marine heatwaves intensify. Entire ecosystems begin to shift. Coral reefs—already stressed—collapse almost entirely in this temperature range. With them go the habitats they support, the fisheries they sustain, the protection they provide to coastlines. For hundreds of millions of people who depend on marine systems, this is not an ecological loss alone. It is economic, nutritional, and cultural.⁵⁶

On land, ecosystems reorganise. Some species move. Others cannot. Ranges contract. Reproduction fails. Forests burn more often. Insects expand into new regions. Tundra softens. Permafrost thaws. 

These are not isolated changes. They accumulate, altering the structure of entire biomes. Extinction is not immediate or uniform, but it accelerates. Some species disappear locally. Others globally. The loss is uneven, but irreversible.⁷⁸

In the Arctic, the change is unmistakable. Summers without sea ice, once rare, become more common. The region warms faster than the global average. Coastlines erode. Communities relocate. Weather patterns shift. What happens in the Arctic does not stay there. It feeds back into the global system, influencing circulation, amplifying warming, reinforcing instability.¹⁰

Across all of this, the defining feature is not any single impact, but how they interact. Heat affects water. Water affects food. Food affects migration. Migration affects cities. Cities affect politics. Extreme weather damages infrastructure, raises insurance costs, strains public finances. Recovery becomes more difficult, not because any one event is catastrophic, but because events no longer arrive in isolation.¹¹

At 2–2.25°C, systems begin to lose resilience together.

Some places will adapt. They invest, plan, redesign. They manage risk, for a time. Others fall behind. The gap between those who can absorb disruption and those who cannot widens. Inequality becomes a climate variable. Exposure is shaped not just by geography, but by wealth, governance, and history.

Crisis becomes normalised. Insurance withdraws from high-risk areas. Governments reallocate budgets toward recovery. Emergency measures become permanent. Political systems strain under repeated shocks. Trust erodes. Not everywhere, not all at once—but enough, often enough, to matter.

This is not collapse in the cinematic sense. It is something more complex and more difficult: a gradual erosion of stability, punctuated by acute events. A world where the margins fail first, then the edges, then parts of the core.

The science does not describe this future as inevitable, but it does describe it as increasingly likely at this level of warming. The difference between 1.5°C and 2°C is measurable. The difference between 2°C and 2.25°C is not a new category, but a deepening of the same pattern—more exposure, more loss, more interaction, less resilience.

It is a world that still functions, but under strain. A world where adaptation continues, but never quite catches up. A world where the question is no longer whether change is happening, but whether systems can hold together as it does.¹²

Back to the hills.

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Notes

¹ IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, headline statements and summary material on rising risks at 2°C versus 1.5°C.
² IPCC AR6 WGII Summary for Policymakers and FAQ material on water stress and heat exposure.
³ IPCC AR6 WGII, impacts on small island states and coastal systems.
⁴ IPCC SR15 and AR6 WGII on sea-level rise, coastal risk, and displacement.
⁵ IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere (SROCC), ocean warming and marine impacts.
⁶ IPCC SR15 Summary for Policymakers on coral reef decline (>99% at 2°C).
⁷ IPCC SR15 on species range loss and ecosystem change.
⁸ IPBES global assessment on biodiversity loss and extinction risk.
⁹ IPCC SR15 on food security and crop yield impacts.
¹⁰ IPCC SR15 on Arctic sea ice frequency and polar amplification.
¹¹ IPCC AR6 WGII on interacting and cascading risks across systems.
¹² World Meteorological Organization, State of the Global Climate reports.

 

The Emotional World: Against Human Exceptionalism

Everything feels something. We often talk as though the world is something humans act upon — a neutral stage shaped by culture, technology, and reason. This assumption has shaped modern life, though it has never gone uncontested. Other perspectives see feeling, emotion, as meaningful, life as relational, and humanity as embedded rather than exceptional. 

The world we inhabit reflects the evolution of the human mind and its emotional roots. As Homo sapiens interpreted, adapted to, and reshaped their surroundings, environment and cognition co-evolved in a continuous dialogue, shaping both the world and our understanding of it. Human history is therefore not merely a record of rational mastery over nature, but the cumulative outcome of embodied, affective, and relational ways of being, through feeling.

Emotion predates language, abstraction, and symbolic thought. Animals (including us) navigate their worlds through fear, attachment, desire, and care — capacities that were, and remain, primary means of orientation in reality. Cognition emerges through emotion, not in opposition to it.¹

Neuroscience reinforces this view: emotion is integral to decision-making, sociality, and survival. Damage to affective processing centers leaves abstract reasoning intact but impairs action, showing that feeling is the foundation of rationality.²

From an evolutionary perspective, this continuity is visible in brain structure. Subcortical systems — including the brainstem, hypothalamus, amygdala, and limbic circuitry — evolved to support survival, attachment, and social coordination long before the neocortex developed. The neocortex did not replace them but operates in dialogue with these ancient networks. Human reasoning is scaffolded upon affective foundations rather than floating independently. This does not imply determinism; rather, it shows that caregiving, childbirth, and social coordination are integral to the co-evolution of mind, culture, and environment.³⁴⁵

Yet modern Western thought has denied this continuity. Masculinist reason was elevated; emotion was relegated to instinct, femininity, and nature. Exceptionalism separated humans from animals and divided humanity internally. Women, associated with reproduction and care, were excluded from full intellectual and moral authority. Nineteenth-century medicine and early psychology pathologized female emotional expression, culminating in hysteria diagnoses.⁶ Freud framed female emotion as excessive and unstable.⁷ As de Beauvoir observed, women became the “Other” against which masculine reason defined itself.⁸ Men, too, were constrained to ideals of disembodied rationality as seen in their latest exploits - destruction by remote control.

This hierarchy scales outward: men over women, humans over animals, Europeans over colonized peoples. Those deemed “closer to nature” were framed as emotional, instinctual, and in need of governance. Exceptionalism functioned as a political technology, equating violent power with rational detachment.⁹

Childbirth and reproductive labor illustrate this clearly. Bringing human worlds into being was rendered biologically necessary but intellectually insignificant. Women’s knowledge was dismissed; birth was medicalized and controlled. Federici shows how this devaluation underpinned capitalism, which relied on unpaid, feminized care.¹⁰

Emotion was never eliminated — it was redistributed. Fear, loyalty, desire, and resentment structured politics, nationalism, markets, and war. Ahmed traces how emotions circulate socially, binding bodies to ideas and producing inclusion or exclusion.¹¹

Other traditions — Indigenous, feminist, and ecological — have long emphasized relationality over hierarchy. Bateson saw ecological crisis as a crisis of mind; Keller demonstrated how detached objectivity distorts knowledge and responsibility.¹²¹³

Seen this way, the ecological crisis is not a side-effect of progress but the outcome of masculinist denial of  emotional and relational continuity with the more-than-human world. Intelligence defined as control, and emotion as weakness cannot respond adequately to collapse.

Rejecting human exceptionalism does not deny human distinctiveness. Humans possess symbolic thought, cumulative culture, and ethical reflection — capacities that emerged through, not against, emotion. Nor does this critique imply universal complicity: many thinkers — male and female, Indigenous and Western — have long advanced relational, ethical, and embodied ways of understanding mind and world. The myth of exceptionalism is powerful, but not total. The task is to recognize, amplify, and align with those traditions, acknowledging that the world was never separate from feeling, and neither are we.

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Footnotes

1. Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error (1994).

2. Paul D. MacLean, The Triune Brain in Evolution (1990).

3. Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience (1998).

4. Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind (2010).

5. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Mothers and Others (2009).

6. Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady (1985).

7. Sigmund Freud, Studies on Hysteria (1895).

8. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1949).

9. Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being” (2003).

10. Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch (2004).

11. Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004).

12. Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972).

13. Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (1985).

Rebalancing the United Kingdom State: Devolution, Localisation and the Reconstruction of Regional Capacity

For more than a generation, Britain has attempted to run a highly centralised fiscal state on top of a deeply uneven regional economy. The results are now unmistakable. Productivity growth has stagnated relative to peer countries, regional disparities remain among the widest in the developed world, infrastructure systems show signs of chronic underperformance, and public services face escalating demand without corresponding strategic coordination. Public expenditure has increased substantially since the early 2000s, yet the institutional capacity to translate spending into sustained regional development has weakened. ¹

This is not primarily a failure of fiscal scale. It is a failure of institutional design. The United Kingdom retains one of the most centralised systems of public finance in advanced economies while relying on fragmented governance arrangements to manage housing delivery, transport integration, energy transition, and skills formation. Policy debates within government, parliamentary committees, and leading think tanks increasingly recognise that Britain’s growth challenge cannot be separated from the structure of the state itself.²

Reorganising the state around regional economic capacity rather than centralised fiscal control therefore represents not an ideological departure but a pragmatic adaptation. Devolution and the localisation of key network utilities offer a route toward restoring the state’s ability to coordinate long-term development, improve public service effectiveness, and strengthen economic resilience.

A devolved municipal-utility model should be viewed primarily as a recomposition of existing public expenditure rather than a wholesale expansion of the state. Within current Treasury fiscal aggregates, Total Managed Expenditure stands at approximately £1.3–1.4 trillion annually, of which Total Expenditure on Services represents around £1.1–1.2 trillion.³ A realistic decentralisation pathway would involve the regional reclassification of roughly £500–600 billion of place-based service delivery functions — including health administration, education, transport, housing, and local infrastructure — from central departmental control into regional and municipal fiscal frameworks. Core elements of annually managed expenditure, such as pensions, most welfare transfers, debt interest, and macroeconomic stabilisation, would remain centrally administered.

In parallel, the transition to local or regional public ownership of key network utilities would occur largely through balance-sheet restructuring rather than sustained increases in annual spending. Asset acquisition in the range of £300–350 billion would increase public sector net debt but would also create income-generating public enterprises. The fiscal logic lies in the redistribution of infrastructure rents: existing revenue streams from energy networks, water services, rail operations, and broadband provision would continue to fund operating costs and capital investment, while a greater share of operating surplus could be retained within public accounts and reinvested regionally.

The case for localisation is reinforced by the ownership structure of Britain’s infrastructure sectors. In the water industry, most companies are now owned by overseas pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and private equity investors operating through highly leveraged financial structures.⁴ Environmental failures — including persistent supply failures and sewage discharges into rivers and coastal waters — have exposed regulatory weaknesses and intensified scrutiny of the sector’s governance model.⁵ Energy distribution networks and major transport operators exhibit similarly internationalised ownership patterns, reflecting the broader financialisation of essential infrastructure.⁶

The United Kingdom has undergone three major state-restructuring moments that illuminate the institutional dynamics of such a transition. Each reconfigured the balance between central authority, market coordination, and regional governance. The post-war settlement demonstrated the political feasibility of large-scale public ownership and institutional redesign following systemic crisis and electoral mandate, yet it also entrenched Whitehall centralisation at the expense of earlier municipal traditions. The reforms of the 1980s reversed this model through privatisation, deregulation, and fiscal consolidation, embedding long-term dependence on regulated private provision and constraining local autonomy. The post-1997 devolution era introduced constitutional decentralisation without corresponding fiscal federalisation, illustrating both the political viability of regional reform and its limits when taxation and expenditure control remain centralised.

Framed pragmatically, deeper devolution and localisation respond to persistent structural challenges: regional productivity disparities, infrastructure underinvestment, housing constraints, and mounting social care pressures that a centralised administrative system struggles to coordinate effectively.⁷ A rebalanced fiscal settlement would shift spending control from approximately 80 per cent central and 20 per cent local to a distribution closer to 60 per cent central and 40 per cent regional or municipal. This restructuring would underpin the emergence of a dual public economy: a nationally coordinated welfare and macro-fiscal state alongside a decentralised system of regionally delivered services and municipally influenced utilities.

Such transformation would have profound implications for employment, labour markets, and skills formation. Regionalisation of service delivery and infrastructure governance would expand demand for technical, managerial, and care-sector roles within local public economies. Large-scale workforce transitions would be required in energy systems, transport operations, housing development, environmental management, and digital administration. These shifts would not simply involve public-sector job creation, but the restructuring of regional labour markets around more stable, investment-linked employment trajectories.

Local authorities and regional institutions would require expanded capabilities in strategic planning, financial management, engineering oversight, digital governance, and integrated service delivery. Large-scale retraining programmes and targeted recruitment would therefore become central components of economic policy.

More fundamentally, localisation implies a reorientation of the national skills system toward regionally embedded economic strategies. Schools, further education institutions, universities, and adult learning programmes would need to align more closely with regional labour-market demand. Over time, strengthened regional procurement systems and infrastructure investment programmes could support the development of locally rooted supply chains, increase employment multipliers and reducing spatial disparities in economic opportunity.

Planning systems would also undergo transformation. Devolution would shift the United Kingdom’s planning regime from a predominantly regulatory model toward a strategic, investment-oriented regional framework. Regional authorities would require enhanced capacity to coordinate land use, housing delivery, transport networks, energy infrastructure, and climate adaptation through integrated long-term development strategies.

Technological change will shape the feasibility of this transition. Advances in artificial intelligence and data systems could reduce administrative costs while increasing demand for higher-skill public sector roles. Ensuring interoperability and governance coherence would remain essential to prevent fragmentation across regional systems.

In macro-fiscal terms, the transition would likely increase public debt initially due to asset acquisition, modestly raise annual deficits, and expand public investment capacity while reducing the scale of the central administrative state. Ultimately, this model would reposition the United Kingdom toward a decentralised developmental framework combining elements of Nordic fiscal devolution, German municipal enterprise traditions, and historic British municipal governance.⁸

Conclusion: Reforming the State Before Economic Drift Becomes Structural Decline

The United Kingdom is approaching a point at which institutional inertia itself becomes a macroeconomic risk. A centralised fiscal state can redistribute resources, but it cannot by itself generate balanced regional development. Infrastructure systems governed primarily through financial incentives cannot reliably deliver long-term public value. Labour markets fragmented by uneven investment and skills mismatches cannot sustain productivity growth.

Existing policy debates — from metro mayor initiatives to parliamentary reviews and think-tank proposals — increasingly acknowledge these realities. Yet recognition alone does not constitute reform. Without a deliberate programme of fiscal devolution, municipal infrastructure stewardship, regional labour-market renewal, and skills system transformation, Britain risks entrenching a model characterised by rising expenditure, uneven growth, and declining institutional effectiveness.

The strategic choice facing policymakers is therefore not between centralisation and decentralisation as abstract principles. It is between maintaining an institutional settlement designed for a different economic era or constructing one capable of coordinating development in a complex regional economy that ultimately benefits all citizens.

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References

1. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development regional productivity data; United Kingdom Office for National Statistics productivity trends.
2. Institute for Fiscal Studies; Resolution Foundation; Centre for Cities; United Kingdom parliamentary committee evidence on fiscal devolution.
3. United Kingdom Treasury Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses.
4. House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee reports on water industry ownership.
5. Environment Agency regulatory enforcement data and sewage discharge reporting.
6. Ofgem market structure reports; transport regulatory ownership analyses.
7. Productivity Commission style regional growth analysis and Centre for Cities spatial productivity reports.
8. Comparative fiscal decentralisation literature on Nordic states and German municipal governance.

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