Global Game, Local Wealth, Distant Power

What Jim Ratcliffe’s remarks reveal about who really benefits from English football

When Manchester United co-owner Sir Jim Ratcliffe recently claimed that Britain has been “colonised by immigrants,” he revived a familiar narrative: global mobility framed as a threat to national identity. Yet few institutions rely more completely on global mobility than English football. The Premier League is built on migrant labour, international capital, and worldwide audiences. Ratcliffe’s remarks therefore illuminate a deeper contradiction — not just about migration, but about how value is created and who ultimately captures it.¹⁰

English football presents itself as meritocratic and universal. Talent rises, supporters unite, and sport transcends politics. But the Premier League is not simply a competition; it is a global labour market embedded in a political economy structured by inequality. Its openness is real — but it is also selective, conditional, and uneven.

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The league runs on global labour

The Premier League operates as one of the most internationalised workforces in world sport. A majority of players are recruited from outside England, and coaching and managerial roles are heavily internationalised.¹ This global labour market is not incidental — it is the foundation of the league’s commercial dominance. International talent raises performance levels, expands broadcasting audiences, and drives global revenue growth.

Global mobility, in other words, is not a threat to English football’s success. It is its precondition as it is in the NHS.

That reality sits uneasily alongside rhetoric portraying migration as national displacement. Ratcliffe’s language may be political, but the structure of the institution he helps govern depends on precisely the processes he problematises. The Premier League thrives because labour and capital move across borders, even as public discourse calls those movements into question.

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Inclusion without equality

The visibility of racialised and migrant players often fuels the belief that football is a model of social progress. But representation on the pitch does not translate into equality across institutions.

Diversity declines sharply away from playing roles and toward positions of authority. Coaching, executive leadership, and ownership remain far less representative than the playing workforce.² The pattern reflects a broader structural logic: diversity in labour, concentration of power elsewhere.

Scholars describe this as racial capitalism — a system in which markets incorporate difference where it produces value while maintaining hierarchy in governance and reward.³⁴ As Paul Gilroy argues, Britain often celebrates racialised cultural production while structural inequalities persist.⁵ English football does not escape this pattern; it dramatizes it.

Recognition is expansive. Equality is limited.

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The myth of pure meritocracy

Football’s self-image as a pure meritocracy is also overstated. Entry into elite pathways depends not only on talent but on access to coaching, networks, and development infrastructure. Research on youth football in England identifies structural barriers affecting progression, including socio-economic inequality and persistent stereotyping in talent identification.⁶⁷

Global recruitment intensifies this dynamic. Clubs compete within an international labour market and prioritise immediate performance outcomes. Investment in established global talent can coexist with uneven domestic development systems. Opportunity appears universal, yet access remains structured.

The system is open — but not equally so.

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Wealth created locally, extracted globally

The Premier League’s most striking contradiction is spatial. Clubs are physically rooted in local communities: stadiums shape urban landscapes, matchdays structure local economies, and supporters generate the cultural authenticity that makes English football globally marketable. The league’s enormous revenues ultimately depend on this local infrastructure of loyalty, presence, and identity.

Yet the wealth generated through this intensely local foundation is largely captured elsewhere. Aptly demonstrated by Ratcliff's offshore tax arrangements.

Broadcasting income is negotiated globally. Commercial partnerships are international. Ownership structures are frequently transnational. Financial returns flow through corporate networks often distant from the communities that sustain the clubs’ value.⁸⁹

The result is a structural asymmetry: football’s value is produced through place but realised through mobile capital. The political economy of the game mirrors this pattern. Football clubs remain central institutions in towns and cities across the UK — repositories of memory, identity, and collective feeling. Yet most are now effectively cash machines owned by transnational investors. Wealth extracted from local communities flows upward, while decision‑making power moves further away.

Clubs depend on local identity to generate global revenue, but the financial architecture of the modern game allows wealth to circulate far beyond the communities that anchor it. Stadiums root clubs socially; ownership detaches them economically. The spectacle appears shared, but the rewards are concentrated.

Fan‑owned and supporter‑controlled clubs such as AFC Wimbledon, FC United of Manchester, Exeter City, and Newport County demonstrate that democratic ownership models are viable. Their marginal status within the football economy, however, reflects a system designed to reward speculative finance and transnational accumulation over local stewardship.

The irony cuts deeper than football. The same society that celebrates migrant excellence when it delivers spectacle continues to organise immigration policy around the binary of “good” and “bad” migrants — contributors versus threats. Windrush, the hostile environment, and everyday bordering practices tell a very different story from the one staged on Saturday afternoons. Football does not contradict Britain’s racial order; it clarifies it. We are willing to cheer almost anyone — so long as they help us win. Belonging, like everything else, remains conditional.

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What Ratcliffe’s remarks ultimately reveal

Ratcliffe’s comments matter not simply because they are controversial, but because they crystallise a structural tension. Economic globalisation expands markets, labour pools, and revenue streams. Political narratives, however, often reassert national boundaries and cultural threat. English football embodies the hypocrisy of this contradiction in concentrated form.

The Premier League celebrates global talent while elite discourse questions global mobility. Migrant players are indispensable when they generate value, yet migration is framed as destabilising in political language. Inclusion is welcomed in practice but contested in principle.

Football, like the society around it, is global in accumulation and national in anxiety.

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A mirror of contemporary Britain

English football is often imagined as separate from politics. In reality, it reflects broader social dynamics with unusual clarity. It shows how diversity can coexist with hierarchy, how local communities generate global wealth without direct benefit, and how inclusion can expand without redistributing power.

The Premier League does not transcend Britain’s political economy — it reveals it. Migrant labour, local identity, and global capital intersect within a system that is open, profitable, and unequal all at once.

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Who Really Wins?

English football is a global game built on the backs of working class communities, migrant and racialised players, yet the wealth it generates rarely stays in the communities that make it possible. The Premier League celebrates talent from across the world, but inclusion is conditional, and power remains concentrated in the hands of owners and investors. Ratcliffe’s claim that the UK has been “colonised by immigrants” exposes the contradiction: the very people whose skill and labour drive the spectacle are often cast as outsiders. Football mirrors Britain itself — global in its reach, local in its energy, yet unequal in who truly benefits. To understand who wins, you have to look beyond the headlines and the highlight reels to the structures that make the game profitable and exclusive all at once.¹⁰

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Sources & Further Reading

1. Premier League squad nationality and staffing data; CIES Football Observatory, Global Migration in Football reports (various years).

2. Football Association (FA), Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Reports; League Managers Association demographic data; Kick It Out, Annual Review of Discrimination in Football (latest edition).

3. Robinson, Cedric J. Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. University of North Carolina Press, 1983.

4. Bhattacharyya, Gargi. Rethinking Racial Capitalism: Questions of Reproduction and Survival. Rowman & Littlefield, 2018.

5. Gilroy, Paul. Postcolonial Melancholia. Columbia University Press, 2005.

6. Bradbury, Steven, and Daniel Wood. “Race, Ethnicity and Youth Football in England: Talent Identification and the ‘Hidden’ Barriers.” Soccer & Society, 2015.

7. Sport England, Active Lives Survey and youth participation data (latest release).

8. Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance and Football Money League (latest edition).

9. UEFA, European Club Finance and Investment Landscape Report (latest edition).

10. Public coverage of Sir Jim Ratcliffe interview remarks and political/civil society responses (Reuters, Sky News, The Guardian, February 2026).

Framework for a Deep Economy: A Future Beyond Growth

For more than a century, economic stability has been organized around gross expansion of output. Growth has functioned not merely as an economic outcome but as a governing principle: sustaining employment, legitimising financial obligations, moderating inequality, and underwriting political authority. Yet this system has always depended on a foundational illusion — that indiscriminate economic activity can expand without ecological limit. By equating prosperity with GDP expansion, modern economies institutionalised a flawed model of stability predicated on infinite growth within a finite world. Today, ecological thresholds, technological transformation, and rising concentration of wealth expose this contradiction and call for a different basis of prosperity.

Economist Thomas Piketty warns that when the return on capital outpaces the growth of the economy (r > g), wealth concentrates in elitist centres over time, threatening social stability and legitimacy in the wider economy. Meanwhile, Kate Raworth’s Doughnut Economics frames clear boundaries for economic activity: we must stay between a social floor, ensuring everyone has access to essentials, and an ecological ceiling, protecting the planet’s life-support systems.

John Maynard Keynes reminds that aggregate demand drives economic stability, and governments can manage demand to prevent crises and maintain cohesion. Joseph Schumpeter highlights the role of innovation and creative destruction in driving progress, showing that even in a post-growth society, technological and organizational change can renew economic capabilities without expanding scale.

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Depth Over Growth

In a post-growth, depth-oriented economy, the goal isn’t to make the economy bigger, but to make it resilient, fair, and sustainable. Prosperity is measured by depth and a stable root system— the ability to maintain and distribute essential resources, social security, and ecological integrity — rather than by output alone.

Key insights:

• Financial stability: Align debt and fiscal interventions to societal and ecological capacity¹.

• Redistribution: Maintain social floors and eradicate inequality².

• Innovation: Renew sectors within ecological and social boundaries⁴.

• Governance: Embed polycentric, participatory systems that enhance legitimacy⁸.

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Finance and Debt

Debt and financial instruments are no longer about extracting future growth. Instead, obligations-flex based on what society can sustainably support. Investments prioritize public infrastructure, renewable energy, and projects that strengthen social and ecological resilience. Wealth accumulation is tolerated only if it reinforces stability and equity. Keynesian tools stabilize demand while respecting ecological limits¹.

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Taxation and Redistribution

Taxes maintain fairness and guarantee access to essentials. Progressive taxation, inheritance moderation, and public ownership stakes prevent wealth from undermining social and ecological stability. Tax receipts are channeled into housing, healthcare, education, energy, and digital access².

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Social Provisioning

Guaranteed access to life’s essentials forms the foundation of legitimacy. Inequality ceilings prevent disparities, while collective management ensures ecological limits are regulated and respected. Keynesian demand management maintains full employment or fair universal wage.³

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Innovation and Technology

Innovation is mission-driven, focused on resilience, accessibility, and ecological impact, rather than market expansion. AI, automation, and scientific research support circular economies, sustainable energy, and climate adaptation. Schumpeterian creative destruction allows sectors to renew within ecological and social boundaries.

Governance of innovation follows Ostrom-inspired principles:

• Participatory decision-making

• Distributed accountability

• Polycentric coordination

This ensures technological advances reinforce societal resilience and equitable access⁴.

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Business and Industrial Design in a Circular Economy

Business and industrial systems are redesigned to minimize waste, maximize resource efficiency, and extend product lifecycles. Products and industrial processes follow circular economy principles: materials are reused, remanufactured, or recycled, and systems are designed to remain within ecological limits.

Key elements:

• Closed-loop production systems

• Resource recovery and reuse

• Integration with renewable energy and sustainable supply chains

This aligns industrial strategy with ecological primacy and social goals, while allowing Schumpeterian innovation and worker participation to thrive. Circular design also supports demilitarization efforts, as industrial capacity is redirected toward sustainable production⁶.

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Employment, AI, and Worker Governance

AI and automation alter not only how goods and services are produced, but how economic participation itself is organized. As productive capacity becomes increasingly decoupled from human labor input, the linkage between employment and livelihood weakens structurally rather than cyclically. A depth-oriented economy responds by securing material security as a social guarantee rather than a by-product of expansion. Universal basic income, guaranteed wages, or equivalent provisioning mechanisms maintain the social floor, while polycentric worker governance directs technological capability toward shared resilience, ecological compliance, and equitable distribution⁵.

New industrial and worker governance models, guided by Ostrom principles, implement:

• Participatory councils

• Cooperative decision-making

• Shared accountability mechanisms

This ensures creative destruction benefits society as a whole rather than concentrating power. Schumpeterian innovation continues, but directed toward resilience, sustainability, and social legitimacy. AI and automation enhance collective well-being while reinforcing ecological limits and social equity⁵.

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Demilitarization and Green Industry

A deep economy transforms the military-industrial complex into a driver of green infrastructure and climate resilience. Defense industries and global military investments are redirected toward renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure, and climate adaptation projects. Polycentric governance ensures that these resources are repurposed collaboratively.

Impacts:

• Reduces global tensions and armed conflict⁶

• Channels industrial capacity toward ecological and social priorities

• Aligns technological, labor, and innovation capabilities with societal needs

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Ecological Primacy

The natural world is the primary societal asset. Soil, water, biodiversity, and climate are foundational capital. Financial, technological, and social systems are organized to maintain ecological ceilings, ensuring all activities respect planetary limits⁷.

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Classical Socialist Insights: Marx, Engels, and Lenin

Classical socialist theory enriches the depth economy framework by highlighting labor, industrial, and global power dynamics:

• Marx: Concerned with labor exploitation and alienation; addressed here through universal basic income, worker councils, and polycentric governance⁵.

• Engels: Focused on industrialisation’s social consequences; addressed through social provisioning, redistribution, and circular industrial design²³.

• Lenin: Critiqued imperialism and militarised production; addressed through demilitaridation, global cooperation, and green industrial repurposing⁶.

These insights are updated for a post-growth, ecological context, balancing worker control, innovation, and planetary stewardship while preserving social and ecological legitimacy.

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Legitimacy and Governance

Economic equality is not only a distributive concern but a structural condition for social stability. Comparative evidence shows that societies with lower income inequality exhibit higher levels of trust, better health outcomes, stronger social mobility, and greater institutional legitimacy. Reducing inequality therefore strengthens the depth of social systems by improving resilience, cohesion, and collective capacity. Policies that compress excessive disparities are not merely redistributive interventions but foundational investments in societal stability and wellbeing.⁹

Authority is earned through stewardship, fairness, and continuity. Governance is:

• Transparent, participatory, and polycentric

• Nested across local, regional, and global levels

• Measured by wellbeing, equity, ecological stability, and accountability⁸

Citizens consent to collective governance because it:

• Protects the natural world

• Ensures fair access to essentials

• Embeds Ostrom-style accountability

• Redirects militarized power toward constructive societal ends

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Integrated Depth Economy Governance

In a post-growth society, we see:

• Financial obligations aligned with social and ecological capacity¹

• Redistribution maintaining social floors²

• Social provisioning guaranteeing essential access³

• Innovation strengthening resilience and renewing sectors⁴

• Circular business and industrial design minimizing waste and aligning with ecological limits

• AI and automation enhancing collective well-being⁵

• Worker and industrial governance embedded in polycentric, participatory structures⁵

• Military-industrial resources redirected to green infrastructure⁶

• Ecological primacy recognized as the foundation of societal wealth⁷

• Classical socialist insights informing labor, industrial, and global power structures

• Legitimacy derived from sustaining depth rather than growth⁸

Prosperity is measured by how well society stays within the doughnut, balancing ecological ceilings and social floors to ensure continuity, equity, and resilience for future generations.

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References

Costanza, R., et al. (1997). The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital. Nature, 387(6630), 253–260.

Jackson, T. (2017). Prosperity without Growth. 2nd edition. Routledge.

Keynes, J.M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Macmillan.

Marx, K. (1867). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. I. Penguin Classics.

Engels, F. (1845). The Condition of the Working Class in England. Penguin Classics.

Lenin, V.I. (1917). Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Progress Publishers.

Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.

Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Raworth, K. (2017). Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist. Chelsea Green.

Schumpeter, J.A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper & Brothers.

Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2009). The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better. Allen Lane.

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Footnotes

1. Debt is capacity-aligned, ensuring obligations do not compromise social or ecological limits, with Keynesian fiscal tools supporting stability.

2. Redistribution funds essentials to maintain the social floor.

3. Social provisioning balances inequality ceilings and ecological limits, supported by demand management principles.

4. Innovation is mission-driven and doughnut-compliant, with creative destruction renewing economic sectors within ecological boundaries, governed by participatory, polycentric structures.

5. Employment models and AI integration follow Ostrom-inspired polycentric governance, ensuring equitable distribution of labor, participation in decision-making, and societal benefit from technological change; this also addresses Marxian concerns about labor exploitation.

6. Military-industrial capacity is redirected toward green industry and climate infrastructure, reducing global conflict potential and aligning industrial resources with ecological and social priorities; this incorporates Leninian critique of imperialism.

7. Ecological primacy treats nature as foundational capital, enforcing the doughnut ceiling.

8. Governance metrics reflect wellbeing, resilience, ecological compliance, and polycentric accountability rather than GDP.

9. Social outcomes of inequality

Enclosures: Paths to perdition

Enclosure refers to the transformation of collectively governed resources — land, labour, knowledge, energy, or ecological capacity — into alienable property controlled by a narrow set of actors. It entails legal, political, and coercive mechanisms that restrict access, commodify use, and concentrate wealth and power.¹ It is the essence of what is now known as neo-liberal economics.

Enclosure is not a neutral process. It is the deliberate act by powerful individuals to turn what belongs to everyone — land, labour, water, knowledge, and even ecological capacity — into private property under their control.¹ It was not civilisational necessity; it was human greed, enforced through law, violence, and coercion. This process was never merely a technical response to alleged public-sector “inefficiency.” Instead, enclosure has historically been a political project — one that systematically reallocated communal resources into the control of elites. The rhetorical claim that markets are efficient and public systems are inherently inefficient serves this project by legitimising dispossession in the language of productivity and progress.

Long before capitalist modernity, human societies governed material and social life through commons-based systems that were durable, rule-bound, and relational. In early medieval England, Saxon village councils administered communal fields, floodplain pastures, woodlands, and waterworks through customary law and collective enforcement.² In the Alpine regions of northern Italy and Switzerland, cooperative management of pastures and irrigation sustained mountain communities over generations.³ Indigenous societies in North America — such as the Haudenosaunee Confederacy — regulated hunting territories, fisheries, and forests through complex protocols that balanced use with regeneration.⁴ Across sub-Saharan Africa, groups like the Tiv and Maasai organised grazing, water access, and seasonal migrations through oral jurisprudence and community councils. In Southeast Asia, the Ifugao rice terraces of the Philippines and the subak irrigation networks of Bali combined ritual practice with ecological knowledge to govern water and labour collectively, long predating colonial intervention.⁵

These arrangements were not benign or egalitarian in any utopian sense, but they were functional governance systems capable of managing scarcity, coordinating risk, and reproducing social and ecological life. Survival depended on social norms of mutual obligation rather than abstract market competition. This configuration is what scholars refer to as a moral economy: economic life constrained by shared expectations of fairness, subsistence security, and collective responsibility.⁶

The rise of elites did not occur because commons-based governance “failed.” It occurred because it worked, constraining unmediated accumulation and embedding resources within social relations. Enclosure emerged when early barons, church estates, and military elites succeeded in exempting themselves from reciprocal obligations, using newly centralised legal and military powers to redefine access rights. Law, religion, and violence were not external to economy; they were instruments in transforming communal systems into privately controlled domains.⁷

The Norman Conquest of England (1066) marks one of the earliest, well‑documented shifts in this direction. Pre‑Conquest Anglo-Saxon England featured village courts and customary tenure systems that regulated shared access to land and forest.⁸ Norman rule introduced feudal tenure, centralised taxation, and legal mechanisms — such as forest law and manorial courts — that repositioned these commons under Norman control.⁹ Monastic estates and aristocratic landholders were among the first systematic enclosers, fencing off fields and woodlands, codifying private access through charters, and reframing common rights as conditional privileges.¹⁰ Over the early modern period, these practices culminated in Parliamentary Enclosure Acts that formalised wide‑scale privatization of open fields and commons.

The British Isles demonstrate how enclosure took different but related forms across regions. In England, the consolidation of open fields into hedged holdings by the 18th and early 19th centuries displaced smallholders and eroded customary rights. Scotland experienced the Highland Clearances, in which landlord-driven eviction and “improvement” rhetoric dismantled clan-based commons, forcing mass migration to industrial cities or overseas.¹¹ In Wales, upland grazing commons and shared pastures were enclosed under estate management, disrupting village subsistence.¹² Ireland represents perhaps the starkest example: centuries of plantation policy, absentee landlordism, and legal expropriation eroded centuries-old communal tenures. The Great Famine (1845–1852) starkly illustrated the prioritisation of property rights over survival, as enclosed English grain exports continued amidst mass starvation of Irish people.¹³

These patterns were exported globally through European conquest and colonialism. In the Americas, Indigenous confederacies and agricultural states were dismantled; land was seized and repurposed for plantation economies dependent on coerced labour.¹⁴ In the Caribbean and American South, land enclosure went hand‑in‑hand with the transatlantic slave trade, supplying enslaved Africans to plantation regimes that generated enormous surplus for European markets.¹⁵ Australia’s Aboriginal lands were declared terra nullius; in New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi facilitated large‑scale land transfers from Māori to settlers; and in Africa and Southeast Asia, pastoral and agrarian commons were overlaid with colonial property regimes tied to export markets.¹⁶ These transformations were justified through narratives of civilisation, productivity, or waste — but in substance they were systematic dispossession.

Where enclosure typically separates people from land or resources, slavery enclosed the human being itself — body, labour, and future rendered as property. From the 16th century onward, European and later American wealth was built less on innovation than on the systematic appropriation of labour and land. Enslaved labour on sugar, cotton, and tobacco plantations supplied the capital for industrial expansion, shipping networks,  personal fortunes and financial sectors in Europe and North America.¹⁷ Far from a marginal anomaly, slavery was a foundational mechanism in early capitalist accumulation, steeped in brutality and the torture of fellow human beings, for profit.

When formal slavery became politically untenable, enclosure did not disappear; it adapted. Colonial regimes reorganised land, labour, and nature on a planetary scale: forests became timber reserves, rivers transport corridors, soils monocultural plantations, and mineral deposits colonial assets.¹⁸ In the contemporary era, fossil fuel extraction marks a decisive escalation of these dynamics. Fossil carbon stored over geological time was captured, commodified, and combusted in the span of a century, producing unprecedented surplus while externalising ecological costs across space and time.¹⁹ States underwrite exploration risk, subsidise production, and guarantee corporate returns, while local populations often endure environmental degradation, loss of livelihoods, and displacement.²⁰

In this process, the biosphere itself has become enclosed. Carbon sinks, water cycles, and atmospheric capacity — once understood as shared ecological commons — are treated as unpriced inputs for corporate profit. This enclosure has not emerged from market efficiency; it depends on the political backing of neo-liberal state institutions and legal frameworks that disentangle economic value from social and ecological cost.

Neoliberalism intensifies these tendencies rather than reversing them. Public goods and services — water, energy, transport, health — have been subject to privatisation or contractual outsourcing. Rail franchises in the UK, built with infrastructure subsidised by public funds, pay dividends to private shareholders while long‑term fiscal liabilities often remain socialised.²¹ Scotland’s publicly owned water utilities demonstrate that access and, in many cases, investment outcomes can be comparable or superior without private profit extraction.²² Digital platforms monetise data generated collectively on infrastructures rooted in public research, turning shared knowledge into corporate surplus.

Empirical research finds that privatisation rarely produces consistent or universal efficiency gains; outcomes depend heavily on governance, regulation, and institutional design.²³ Energy markets in the US and Europe show that consumer prices can rise after privatisation, while underinvestment in grid resilience and renewable integration is offset by the reliance on public subsidies and risk guarantees.²⁴ Any apparent productivity gains are frequently overwhelmed by contractual complexity and the socialisation of risk.

Responses to enclosure have also shaped history. Labour unions, welfare states, and public services emerged as defensive institutions, institutionalising fragments of earlier moral economies within hostile systems, collectivising bargaining, regulating access to work, and enforcing social norms.²⁵ Yet they remain constrained, continually undermined by the same forces that drive enclosure.

Civilisation now confronts the terminal form of enclosure. What was once land and labour has expanded to ecosystems, knowledge systems, climate stability, and the very conditions of habitable life. The question is no longer whether public or private systems are more efficient; it is whether the foundational conditions that sustain life are to be collectively governed or appropriated for private extraction.

History suggests that enclosure is interrupted not by technical fixes or managerial reforms, but by collective refusal at scale — through strikes, mass mobilisation, and coordinated non‑cooperation. If enclosure is global, resistance must also be global; if dispossession is systemic, responses cannot be individualised.

Today, the impacts of mass enclosure are visible everywhere: in aristocratic estates still controlling land titles; in multinational corporations dominating energy, food, and data markets; in tax systems that favour capital over labour; and in legal regimes that protect private property above all else. These privileges are built on systemic dispossession — of commons, of labour, of technologies, of ecosystems — across continents and centuries. Efficiency arguments, technicalism, or incremental reform will not dismantle this structural capture.

The future of civilisation depends on whether populations reassert the older, dangerous principle that the conditions of life should not belong to elites alone. Whether through organised labour, ecological alliances, Indigenous sovereignty, or new forms of democratic governance, the possibility of reclaiming shared governance remains open — but it will not be granted. It must be taken.

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Footnotes

1. Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation. Beacon Press; Harvey, David. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press.

2. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge University Press.

3. Fleming, Robin. 1991. Kings and Lords in Conquest England. Cambridge University Press.

4. Bartlett, Robert. 2000. England Under the Norman and Angevin Kings, 1075–1225. Oxford University Press.

5. Mann, Charles. 2005. 1491. Vintage.

6. Thompson, E.P. 1963. The Making of the English Working Class. Vintage.

7. Banner, Stuart. 2005. Possession and Conquest: The Legal History of the Territorial Frontier. Cambridge University Press.

8. Fleming, Robin. 1991. Kings and Lords in Conquest England.

9. Bartlett, Robert. 2000. England Under the Norman and Angevin Kings.

10. Ibid.

11. Devine, T.M. 2018. The Scottish Clearances. Penguin.

12. Jenkins, Geraint H. 1992. The Foundations of Modern Wales. Oxford University Press.

13. Mokyr, Joel. 1983. Why Ireland Starved. Routledge; Ó Gráda, Cormac. 1999. Black ’47 and Beyond. Princeton University Press.

14. Mann, Charles. 2005. 1491.

15. Williams, Eric. 1944. Capitalism and Slavery. University of North Carolina Press.

16. Scott, James C. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed. Yale University Press.

17. Baptist, Edward E. 2014. The Half Has Never Been Told. Basic Books.

18. Harvey, David. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press; Bridge, Gavin, et al. 2013. “The Third Carbon Age.” Environment and Planning A 45(8): 1905–1927.

19. Newell, Peter & Daniel Peterson. 2019. “The Political Economy of the Carbon Transition.” Review of International Political Economy 26(4): 699–728.

20. Bebbington, Anthony, et al. 2018. “Resource Extraction and Infrastructure Threaten Forest Cover and Community Rights.” PNAS 115(52): 13164–13173.

21. Estache, Antonio, Stephane Perelman & Luis Trujillo. 2005. “Infrastructure Performance and Reform.” Policy and Society 27(3): 221–248.

22. Hall, David & Emanuele Lobina. 2006. “Water Privatisation and Restructuring in England and Wales.” International Journal of Water 2(1): 47–72.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Thompson, E.P. 1963. The Making of the English Working Class.

The Clash of Capitalisms: Keynes & Schumpeter Reclaim the Commons - Hayek & Friedman Crash and Burn

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From privatised water, rail, energy, and housing to AI-displaced labour, the neoliberal order falters — and emergence of Keynesian and Schumpeterian principles offer a new path to freedom, security, and dignity.

Keynes and Schumpeter understand something that Hayek and Friedman explicitly deny: capitalism is not morally neutral and cannot govern itself. For Keynes, markets do not self‑stabilise and unemployment is not a personal failing but a systemic outcome that destroys democratic legitimacy if left unauthorised; social provision is not charity but the currency of collective consent.¹ Schumpeter shows that innovation is not merely creative — it is destructive, permanently displacing workers and communities in a dynamic that economics must absorb, not celebrate.² Both locate economics within ethics and politics, asking not how efficient markets are, but whether they can sustain a society without tearing it apart.

Hayek and Friedman take the opposite view. They elevate markets from mechanisms of allocation to moral authorities, recasting suffering as natural outcome and inequality as virtuous signal. What Keynes and Schumpeter regard as political responsibilities, Hayek and Friedman treat as immutable natural facts demanding obedience. This is not academic nuance — it is a rupture in the moral framework of governance, where obedience to market outcomes replaces collective accountability as the criterion for legitimacy.

Under this view, work becomes a test of moral worth. Labour — any labour — is valorised. Hardship is taken as character discipline. Those pushed out by structural shifts are recast not as victims of systemic change but as personal failures. Neoliberalism sacrifices social responsibility to belief in markets as ethical arbiters.

This theology of markets cannot be democratically sustained in its pure form. In Chile under Pinochet, the Chicago School's neoliberal policy is imposed through authoritarian violence — wages crushed, unions destroyed, public sectors dismantled — because pure‑market rule cannot win consent on its own terms. This is not an aberration; it is a demonstration of what neoliberalism requires when it asserts markets as moral imperatives rather than tools of governance.

When the same logic arrives in Britain and the United States, it does not come with tanks but with policy. Thatcher and Reagan break unions, slash welfare, deregulate finance, and sell off public infrastructure. Water, rail, energy, and housing — the essential commons of collective life — are privatised, transferred from democratic stewardship into private profit streams. This is not reform. It is organised expropriation: public utilities built through collective investment turn into sites of monopolistic extraction where prices rise and investment lags, benefitting shareholders rather than users.³ Privatised water or energy companies in the UK, for example, have handed hundreds of billions to shareholders while families face higher bills and deteriorating services.⁴

This is enclosure in its modern form: the seizure of shared resources and their conversion into private revenue flows. Citizens become captive consumers paying for essentials that were once structured as rights, not profit centres. This is not market efficiency — it is organised extraction that erodes the very conditions of collective life.

The state does not retreat; it changes sides. Coercion morphs into bureaucracy. Workfare regimes, public/private partnerships, benefit sanctions, surveillance architectures, and moralised scarcity insist that survival still must be earned, even as the jobs that once anchored survival disappear.

At the heart of this order lies its defining injustice. It insists that dignity must be earned through labour, yet rewards ownership without labour. Owners of capital, landlords, rentiers, and financiers extract income detached from meaningful contribution while everyone else must fight for precarious work that is increasingly automated and insecure. Freedom flows upward; discipline flows downward. This is not hypocrisy. It is the system functioning exactly as it was designed.

Neoliberalism is not merely an economic doctrine; it is a political theology. Markets are omniscient; scarcity is sacred; failure is moral deficiency.

Artificial intelligence now lays this theology bare. AI decouples productivity from human labour; value is generated without jobs. Efficiency accelerates even as livelihoods evaporate — precisely the desert neoliberal theology never accounted for. The neoliberal response — harsher discipline, deeper exclusion — no longer even pretends to offer legitimacy. It can only punish despair with moral judgement.

Universal Wage is not utopia. It is institutional necessity. It recognises what Keynes and Schumpeter both understood and neoliberalism worked to erase: displacement is structural and inevitable; it is not moral failure. Keynes saw unemployment as a systemic condition requiring social protection to sustain democracy;³ Schumpeter saw displacement as continuous, requiring institutions capable of absorbing capitalism’s own disruptions.⁴ Universal Wage unites these insights by recognising independent human life beyond compulsory employment as legitimate.

Under Universal Wage, those displaced by automation are not treated as deviant, idle, or deficient. They are recognised as full members of society — creating, caring, learning, organising, experimenting, living outside the labour market without punishment. This is not idleness. It is the formal recognition of human life beyond work.

Most crucially, Universal Wage generalises the freedom already monopolised by elites. The wealthy are not required to justify their existence through labour; they are free to explore, fail, withdraw, and create. Universal Wage extends that freedom downward instead of enclosing it behind capital ownership.

In this frame, AI’s productivity is socialised rather than captured. Economic security becomes foundational rather than conditional. Public support ceases to be emergency relief and becomes the infrastructure of autonomy, creativity, care, and ecological repair. Markets persist; innovation continues; but dignity no longer depends on employment.

Neoliberalism claims inevitability. In truth, it is a moral narrowing enforced through enclosure, discipline, and fear. Universal Wage is the real innovation — not because it abandons markets, but because it restores legitimacy where neoliberalism destroys it. Where Hayek and Friedman demand obedience to markets, Keynes and Schumpeter demand responsibility to society. Where neoliberalism sanctifies suffering, Universal Wage restores dignity as the precondition of democracy. And where neoliberalism encloses commons — water, rail, energy, housing — Universal Wage points toward a future where the economy exists to sustain life, not extract from it.

In a world where work no longer anchors worth or survival, the question is no longer whether this argument is radical.

It is whether democratic life can survive without acting on it.

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Footnotes

1. Keynes on legitimacy and unemployment: Keynes, J.M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan, 1936), Chapters 2–3, 10–12 — argues that full employment cannot be left to spontaneous market forces and that unemployment is a macroeconomic problem requiring collective solutions.

2. Schumpeter on destruction as structural: Schumpeter, J.A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper & Row, 1942), Part II — articulates the concept of “creative destruction,” emphasising that innovation inherently disrupts existing social structures and labour.

3. Privatisation effects on utilities and shared resources: Bayliss, K., Fine, B., & Robertson, M. “Privatisation, Inequality and Poverty in the UK,” International Journal of Public Policy, 2018 — documents how privatised utilities often prioritise shareholder returns over public service quality and affordability.

4. Empirical evidence of privatisation transfers: Booth, R. & Kollewe, J., “UK public paid nearly £200bn to shareholders of key industries since privatisation, study finds,” The Guardian (2025) — shows how privatised sectors transfer significant wealth to investors while consumers face higher costs.

5. AI, labour, and decoupling of productivity: Ng, A. & Brynjolfsson, E., “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2025 — analyses how AI reduces reliance on human labour and challenges traditional social contracts around work.

The Grand Deception Policy: How GDP Hides Planetary Destruction in Plain Sight

 

Gross Domestic Product reporting (GDP) functions as the lingua franca of the global economy. States, multilateral institutions, and financial markets treat it as the primary indicator of economic performance. Fiscal policy, central bank mandates, sovereign credit assessments, and development assistance are routinely justified through GDP growth, while alternative indicators—such as the Human Development Index (HDI) or the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI)—remain marginal to decision-making processes. In practice, GDP dominates how governments, corporations, and investors define “growth,” even as it systematically records ecological destruction, social harm, and resource depletion as positive economic activity.¹

Despite its use today, GDP was never intended to measure economic 'success'. National income accounting emerged in the 1930s as a tool to track aggregate output during the Great Depression. Simon Kuznets, one of its principal architects, explicitly warned that “the welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measure of national income.”² During the Second World War, statisticians working under John Maynard Keynes—including Richard Stone and Erwin Rothbarth — refined these accounting systems for purposes of mobilisation, planning, and resource allocation.³ Following the Bretton Woods conference, GDP was standardised as the global metric of economic performance and consolidated through the work of economists such as Colin Clark and Stone.⁴ What began as a limited accounting instrument gradually hardened into the dominant proxy for measuring prosperity itself.

This shift constitutes a profound conceptual error. A metric designed to measure the monetary value of market output has been elevated into the primary signifier of economic success, conferring legitimacy on policy while systematically obscuring social and ecological costs. The gross monetisation of a diminishing, finite asset base is recorded as “growth,” as though the biophysical foundations of economic activity were inexhaustible.

Nothing in the material world is exempt from limits—least of all natural systems subjected to continuous extraction. Nevertheless, mainstream growth economics treats the economy as if it operates independently of ecological constraints. This is not optimism; it is a category error. As ecological economists have long argued, the economy is a subsystem of the biosphere, not the reverse.⁵

GDP does not measure prosperity. It measures the aggregate market value of monetised transactions, irrespective of whether those transactions enhance or undermine human or ecological wellbeing.

Forests enter national accounts only when felled. Rivers register economically when dammed, or when polluted and commercially remediated. Human beings appear primarily as units of labour or consumption—productive when employed, valuable when sick enough to require treatment, visible when exhausted or repaired sufficiently to return to work. The value of oceans, lakes, soils, community cohesion, and ecological regeneration are not accounted for unless they are directly priced and sold.⁶

Under GDP accounting, a society can actively degrade its own life-support systems and still appear economically successful. War increases output through arms production and reconstruction. Oil spills generate cleanup contracts. Prison expansion boosts construction and employment. Chronic illness drives healthcare expenditure. Deforestation produces timber, pulp, and transport revenue while eliminating carbon sinks. Hurricanes, floods, and wildfires raise GDP through emergency response and rebuilding. This is not a misinterpretation of the data; it follows directly from the accounting logic of GDP.⁷

GDP tracks monetised flows, not depleted assets. A standing forest contributes nothing to national income; once destroyed, it generates measurable growth across extraction, processing, logistics, and finance. Resource exhaustion is treated as an “externality” until collapse forces recognition through crisis expenditure. In material terms, growth functions as liquidation.⁸

Karl Polanyi demonstrated that this outcome is structural rather than accidental. Growth depends on the dis-embedding of land, labour, and money from the social and ecological relations that sustain them. Land is reduced to property, labour to output, money to a self-reproducing abstraction. Once stripped of relational context, extraction proceeds with diminished moral and political visibility.⁹

Herman Daly removes any remaining ambiguity. Economies are physical systems governed by the laws of thermodynamics. Every increment of growth requires energy and material throughput and produces waste. When extraction exceeds regenerative capacity, growth becomes unequivocally destructive—regardless of what aggregate indicators report.¹⁰

Arturo Escobar identifies a further mechanism sustaining the growth paradigm: epistemic exclusion. Indigenous, subsistence, and care-based economies are marginalised not because they are inefficient, but because they reveal growth to be contingent rather than inevitable. These systems are neither utopian nor conflict-free, but they demonstrate that economies need not be organised around perpetual throughput and growth.¹¹

GDP persists because it concentrates power while exporting the costs of growth—onto extraction zones, racialised labour, degraded ecosystems, and future generations absent from national accounts. Growth appears clean only because its violence is spatially, socially, and temporally displaced.

If this is what prosperity looks like, the central danger is not collapse alone.
It is the continued misrecognition of destruction as success.

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Footnotes

1. Stiglitz, J. E., Sen, A., & Fitoussi, J.-P. (2009). Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress.

2. Kuznets, S. (1934). National Income, 1929–1932. U.S. Senate Document No. 124.

3. Stone, R. (1951). The Role of Measurement in Economics. Cambridge University Press.

4. Clark, C. (1940). The Conditions of Economic Progress. Macmillan.

5. Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1971). The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Harvard University Press.

6. Waring, M. (1988). If Women Counted. Harper & Row.

7. Fioramonti, L. (2017). The World After GDP. Polity Press.

8. Daly, H. (1996). Beyond Growth. Beacon Press.

9. Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. Beacon Press.

10. Daly, H. & Farley, J. (2011). Ecological Economics: Principles and Applications. Island Press.

11. Escobar, A. (2015). Encountering Development. Princeton University Press.

Artificial Intelligence Is Not Artificial — It’s Real and not intelligent

Artificial intelligence is often described as “cloud-based,” immaterial, or effortless. This description is misleading; an epic marketing deception. AI is deeply material: every response, image, or prediction depends on large-scale infrastructure. Servers consume megawatts of electricity, data centres require massive amounts of water for cooling, and semiconductors rely on rare and contested minerals. AI is not abstract. It is material, extractive, and energy-intensive.

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Energy Demand and Infrastructure Lock-In

AI’s energy requirements are growing rapidly. Training a single large model can consume as much electricity as thousands of households in a year¹. Once deployed, these systems run continuously to serve millions of users¹. Even when companies claim to run on renewable energy, the scale of infrastructure locks in decades of high-energy use¹. Efficiency improvements reduce energy per calculation but do not prevent total energy consumption from increasing². Cheaper computation drives more demand: bigger models, more queries, more energy².

According to the International Energy Agency, global electricity use by data centres — driven largely by AI workloads — is projected to more than double from 415 terawatt-hours in 2024 to around 945 terawatt-hours by 2030, roughly equivalent to the annual electricity consumption of a country the size of Japan¹. In the United States, hyperscale data centres already consume around 2% of national electricity, with some metropolitan regions seeing over 10% of local grid capacity dedicated to cloud and AI infrastructure, illustrating how rapid AI growth can stress energy systems even before global totals double¹.

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Deliberate Invisibility

AI interfaces are intentionally designed to hide these material realities. The “cloud” metaphor, and dashboards; sustainability reports do not appear in daily user experience. This invisibility is not accidental; it is functional. By hiding energy, water, land, and labour costs, corporations avoid scrutiny and ensure the expansion of AI infrastructure remains politically uncontested.

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Market Control and Digital Power

This invisibility supports a broader concentration of power. Large AI companies do not simply provide services; they increasingly control digital markets. By owning models, cloud infrastructure, proprietary data, and access to compute, a small number of firms are able to set the terms under which AI can be developed and used. High energy and infrastructure costs act as barriers to entry, preventing meaningful competition and locking governments, universities, and smaller firms into dependency on corporate platforms. Decisions about how much computation is used, for what purposes, and at what environmental cost are therefore concentrated in private hands, where growth and market dominance are prioritised over ecological or social limits.

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Geopolitical and Environmental Implications

AI’s material footprint extends beyond energy. Rare earth minerals, water, and land are extracted and distributed through global supply chains governed by purchasing power and legal authority³. For example, Neodymium, a rare earth element critical for high-performance permanent magnets used in data centres, is mined primarily in China, the United States, and Australia³⁴. Benefits are concentrated while environmental and social costs are externalised onto vulnerable communities and ecosystems³⁵. Structural inequities are not addressed by efficiency improvements, green certification, or auditing³.

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Opportunity Costs and Climate Consequences

Even when AI contributes to climate-related work, such as optimising energy systems, its energy consumption competes with other urgent decarbonisation efforts¹. Every watt powering large AI models is a watt unavailable for public transport, electrified housing, or other critical climate solutions¹. Rapid expansion risks reinforcing energy scarcity and undermining planetary stability¹.

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Intelligence and Ecological Limits

Intelligence in ecological and social systems is relational and adaptive, balancing use with sustainability. Current AI systems prioritise scale, speed, and control over sustainability. Unlimited growth and extraction are not intelligent; they are destructive. AI expansion erodes the ecological and social conditions necessary for human and planetary survival.

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Policy and Ethical Implications

AI energy consumption must be recognised as a planetary boundary issue. Large-scale AI should be treated as heavy infrastructure, subject to limits on energy, water, and supply-chain impact. Smaller, slower, and community-focused AI systems could serve practical needs within ecological limits. Governance requires transparency, accountability, and attention to environmental and social justice.

Artificial intelligence is not artificial. It is material, extractive, and energy-intensive. Its growth is neither neutral nor invisible. Unless these realities are acknowledged and addressed, AI will continue to threaten the planetary systems that sustain life and knowledge.

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Annotated Footnotes

 1. International Energy Agency (IEA), “Energy Demand from AI,” 2025

Link

2. Chen, X., et al., “Electricity Demand and Grid Impacts of AI Data Centers,” arXiv, 2025
Link

3. Wikipedia, “Neodymium” (accessed 2026)
Link

4. Wikipedia, “Neodymium magnet” (accessed 2026)
Link

5. China Briefing, “China’s Rare Earth Elements Dominance,” 2024
Link

Authoritarianism: U.S., Iran, and Lessons To learn

Authoritarianism does not always arrive as a sudden, unmistakable scream. Sometimes it arrives as a gasp of disbelief — the moment when people realize that what they assumed could not happen here is already underway.

In Iran, the scream began decades ago. Today, state power is openly fused with religious authority: protest is treated as heresy, dissent as treason, and death as the cost of defiance. The regime kills not only to suppress opposition but to reaffirm a moral order grounded in religious extremism. Sovereignty is justified through divine sanction, and power is rendered absolute because it claims sacred legitimacy. Against this, the courage of Iranian protesters is not abstract. It is visible in shopkeepers closing their stalls, in families marching together, in young women and men demanding a future they have never been permitted. Peaceful dissent has become a last resort under conditions of severe repression and the profound corruption of both state and religion. Thousands have been killed, many more injured or imprisoned, yet resistance persists even as the regime clings to power through violence and plunder.

The United States is not Iran. And while it is not possible to claim equivalence of suffering between the United States and Iran it is necessary to conduct a structural comparison of how moral authority and state power converge to legitimize repression at different stages of authoritarian emergence. But this distinction increasingly conceals more than it clarifies.

What separates these contexts is not the presence or absence of religious extremism, but how explicitly it is named. Iran’s authoritarianism is theocratic by admission. In the United States, religiously inflected ideas shape moral and political claims while the state maintains a formal separation of church and state. Religious extremism in the U.S. does not rule through clerical decree. Instead, its influence flows through cultural communication and elite behavior: pastors, politicians, media figures, and institutional leaders frame flag, nationhood, borders, punishment, and hierarchy as morally sanctioned. These narratives circulate through sermons, policy debates, campaign rhetoric, media ecosystems, and social norms, shaping which policies feel legitimate, which populations are cast as threats, and which uses of force are publicly tolerated. By translating mainstream religious narratives into political common sense, extremism gains practical power without ever declaring a theocracy.

This structure is not unique to Christianity or Islam. Hindu nationalism in India, Buddhist extremism in Myanmar, Jewish religious nationalism in Israel, and biblical literalism in Western politics all demonstrate the same pattern: religious identity fused with state power, diversity recoded as danger, and violence framed as moral necessity. The theologies differ. The logic does not. In each case, politically moralized authority is used to decide whose rights count and whose do not.

The U.S.–Iran comparison is unsettling because it reveals the same underlying structure at different stages. State violence is not ethically measured by body count. This is not about equivalence of scale or suffering. Rather, what matters is intent, precedent, and direction of travel. A threshold is crossed when lethal force is framed not as a tragic political failure but as a justified necessity — when violence becomes morally defensible rather than politically accountable.

Iran’s violence is explicit. America’s is procedural. In Iran, sovereignty announces itself through religious law and overt coercion. In the United States, force is administered through broad statutory authority, executive orders, and agency discretion, often operating ahead of meaningful judicial review. Violence appears not as ideology but as enforcement: lawful, authorized, necessary. Yet this procedural framing does not restrain power; it legitimates it. By dispersing responsibility across institutions and insulating action through legality, repression becomes harder to name. This is not a gentler logic than Iran’s — it is the same logic translated into administrative form, where harm is justified not by God but by law.

Liberal defenses point to courts, elections, and protest rights. But authoritarianism rarely begins by abolishing these forms; it works by hollowing them out. Law becomes a tool for moral discrimination and exclusion. Accountability remains formal while eroding in practice. Pluralism — the recognition that diverse beliefs and identities are entitled to equal protection — is affirmed rhetorically while selectively suspended in enforcement. Some people, typically those with recognized status, majority identity, or social privilege, remain fully protected by law and institutional accountability. Others are rendered conditional, their safety dependent on compliance, documentation, or political usefulness. Others become precarious — detainable, deportable, even killable with impunity or plausible deniability — guided by narratives of purity and threat that religious extremism produces everywhere. Different gods, same logic: sacred or moralized authority deciding whose lives matter.

Across both contexts — in Tehran and on U.S. streets — people mobilize not because dissent is easy, but because there is nowhere else to go. Protesters are the living measure of what is at stake. Their courage marks the points at which power reveals itself most clearly: the moments when the state learns it can harm, justify, and proceed without consequence.

Here lies the brutal irony. The United States condemns Islamic extremism abroad while refusing to name the Christian-inflected moral absolutism that shapes its own governance. One form of religious power is recognized, feared, and monitored. The other is normalized, reframed as law, order, or national interest, allowing moral authority to operate without accountability as theology.

The final test is simple and unforgiving. If the killing and suppression of protesters is rightly understood as evidence of authoritarian consolidation in Iran, then similar acts carried out by U.S. authorities under executive and statutory power must be judged by the same ethical standard. To excuse or minimize them because the theology is Christian, nationalist, or unspoken is to fail the test.

For the United States, the lesson is immediate. Look to the courage of Iranians who have protested for decades under bullets, prisons, and executions. Their resistance was not reckless; it was necessary. Democratic survival demands vigilance now — before rights are stripped through procedure, dissent is criminalized through policy, and emergency powers normalize repression in the name of order.

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References

Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran: A Modern History. Yale University Press, 2008.

Human Rights Watch. World Report 2025: Iran.

United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2025.

Pew Research Center. Global Restrictions on Religion, 2024.

Sager, Emily. “Christian Nationalism and American Governance.” Journal of Religion and Politics, 2024.

United States Congress. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 1952.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Overview, 2025.